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I.

INTRODUCTION

In January 2008, the United States Supreme Court issued a
unanimous decision which held that investment advisory fees paid by
1
a trust may not be deducted in full for income tax purposes. The
† J.D. Candidate 2011, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., Political Science,
University of Minnesota —Duluth, 2005. For more than three years the author has
worked as a Trust Officer in Wells Fargo’s Wealth Management Group. He would like
to thank Sara for her continuing patience and support throughout his law school
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previous sentence may prompt 95% of readers to put this case note
down and continue on with their business. Admittedly, tax law—
specifically, income tax law as it pertains to trusts and estates—is not
the sexiest topic. The outcome of this seemingly mundane topic,
however, has multi-million dollar consequences for both the
government and those who rely on trusts for income. There are
nearly four million estates and trusts that outsource roughly $10.2
billion a year for legal, accounting, tax reporting and asset
2
management services. In addition to these expenses these trusts and
estates also pay trustees an additional $4 billion for their asset3
management services. Needless to say, the tax revenue to be gained
by the government and the income to be lost for beneficiaries are
substantial and warrant attention from even non-tax professionals.
This case note will first provide a brief statutory history of
Internal Revenue Code Section 67 and a basic outline of how the
4
federal income tax is calculated. It will then provide a brief synopsis
of the jurisdictional split as to the deductibility issues among federal
5
circuit courts of appeals. It will proceed with a discussion of both the
6
7
factual and procedural setting of the Knight decision in addition to
the proposed regulations set forth by the Department of the Treasury
8
(Treasury). This discussion will be followed by the Supreme Court’s
9
holding based on those facts and will conclude with an analysis of the
10
11
opinion and the Treasury’s proposed regulations. The purpose of
this note is to evaluate the practical effects of both the current
proposed regulations to section 67(e) and the possible amendments
to these proposed regulations in light of the Supreme Court’s holding
in Knight.

experience. He would also like to thank his parents for their support over the years
and the William Mitchell Law Review staff for their efforts in preparing this article for
publication.
1. Knight v. Comm’r, 552 U.S. 181 (2008).
2. Tom Herman, Trust-Fees Ruling Causes Pain – Justices Decision Limits Deductions
for Tax Purposes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2008, at D6.
3. Id. (citing Eileen Sher, a tax technical manager at the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants in Washington).
4. See infra, Part II(A).
5. See infra, Part II(B).
6. See infra, Part III(A).
7. See infra, Part III(B).
8. See infra, Part III(C).
9. See infra, Part IV.
10. See infra, Part V(A).
11. See infra, Part V(B).
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II. HISTORY
A. Statutory Background
Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) imposes a tax
12
on all “taxable income” of both individuals and trusts. In order to
calculate taxable income, a taxpayer must first determine the amount
13
of his or her “gross income.”
Gross income is defined as “all
14
income from whatever source derived.” “Adjusted gross income” is
then determined by subtracting from gross income certain “above15
the-line” deductions, such as trade and business expenses. “Taxable
income” is then calculated by subtracting “itemized deductions” —
also known as “below-the-line” deductions —from the taxpayer’s
16
adjusted gross income.
Prior to the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, below-theline deductions were fully deductible from a taxpayer’s adjusted gross
17
income. Complexities and inefficiencies arose out of this system for
18
both the taxpayers and the IRS. Taxpayers were required to keep
extensive records of their common expenditures which in turn caused
“significant administrative and enforcement problems for the
19
[IRS].” This complexity and the correlating potential for abuse led
Congress to enact what is commonly referred to as the “2% floor” by
20
adding section 67 to the Code.
Section 67(a) states that “the miscellaneous itemized deductions
for any taxable year shall be allowed only to the extent that the
aggregate of such deductions exceeds 2 percent of adjusted gross
21
income.” Section 67(b) then goes on to exempt from the 2% floor
12. I.R.C. § 1(a)-(e) (2010).
13. William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Comm’r, 467 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir.
2006).
14. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2010). “Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross
income means all income from whatever source derived . . . .” Id.
15. I.R.C. § 62(a) (2010). Section 62(a) outlines twenty deductions that may be
subtracted from a taxpayer’s gross income to reach his or her adjusted gross income.
Id.
16. I.R.C. § 63 (2010).
17. Knight v. Comm’r, 552 U.S. 181, 184 (2008).
18. Id.
19. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-426, at 109 (1985)).
20. Id.
21. I.R.C. § 67(a) (2010). “The utility of itemized deductions generally depends
upon whether in the aggregate (after a 2 percent floor imposed on some itemized
deductions and a reduction in most itemized deductions of high-income taxpayers)
they exceed the ‘standard deduction.’” JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 575 (Foundation Press 2009) (1972). The standard
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22

certain specifically enumerated itemized deductions. Investment
advisory fees are typically treated as itemized deductions under
23
Section 212. However, because they are not listed in section 67(b),
24
these fees are subject to the 2% floor established by section 67(a).
Section 67(e) extends the application of the 2% floor to the
miscellaneous itemized deductions of trusts and estates with one
25
exception relevant to this particular case note. A trust’s costs are
deductible in full (not subject to the 2% floor) “if they satisfy both of
the following two requirements: (1) they are ‘paid or incurred in
connection with the administration of the . . . trust’; and (2) they
‘would not have been incurred if the property were not held in such
26
trust.’”
B. Jurisdictional Splits

27

deduction came into the Code in 1944 as a way to ease the burden of administration.
Id. If a taxpayer’s itemized deductions did not surpass the 2% floor of section 67, or
if he simply chose not to itemize his deductions, the taxpayer could punt and claim
the standard deduction. Id. The standard deduction was seen to ease the burden of
both the taxpayer and the IRS. Id. at 574-77.
22. William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Comm’r, 467 F.3d 149, 153 (2006).
23. Id. See also I.R.C. § 212 (2010). Section 212 allows for a deduction of “all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year (1) for the
production or collection of income; (2) for the management, conservation or
maintenance of property held for the production of income . . . .” Id.
24. Rudkin Testamentary Trust, 467 F.3d at 153. See also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.671T(a)(1)(ii) (1988) (stating that investment advisory fees are subject to the 2% floor
of § 67(a)).
25. I.R.C. § 67(e) (2010).
26. Rudkin Testamentary Trust, 467 F.3d at 151 (quoting I.R.C. § 67(e)).
27. The three cases that follow in this section highlight an interesting aspect of
federal income tax law; namely that there are three separate routes in which a
taxpayer may litigate an income tax deficiency controversy. JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL.,
supra note 21, at 968. The first route is through the Tax Court. A taxpayer, without
actually paying the claimed tax deficiency, may file a petition in Tax Court. If the Tax
Court affirms the Commissioner’s claimed deficiency, the taxpayer may then file an
appeal with the United States Court of Appeals in the circuit in which he or she
resides. If the taxpayer wishes to forgo any possible administrative remedies available
to him under the Tax Court route, he may choose to pay the deficiency in full and file
a claim in federal district court for an income tax refund. Any appeal from the
district court would go to the appeals circuit in which he or she resides. The last
route is through the United States Court of Federal Claims. Like the federal district
court route, a taxpayer must pay the claimed deficiency in full prior to initiating a suit
in the Court of Federal Claims. Unlike the district court route, there is no jury trial
available in this forum and its organization and procedures are very similar to that of
the Tax Court. Any appeal from this court goes to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. There are numerous tactical reasons a taxpayer may choose
one forum over another, however, if a taxpayer chooses to pay less than the deficiency
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1. The Sixth Circuit: O’Neill v. Commissioner
The first fully litigated case on the issue of the deductibility of
28
trust or estate investment advisory fees was O’Neill v. Commissioner.
For the 1987 taxable year, the first year in which the 2% floor was in
effect, the co-trustees of the William J. O’Neill, Jr. Irrevocable Trust
(the O’Neill Trust) deducted, in full, $15,374 of investment advisory
29
fees incurred by the trust.
The Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue Service subsequently issued a Notice of Deficiency for $3534
in tax owed by the trust finding that the investment advisory fees
constituted a “miscellaneous itemized deduction” under section
30
67(a).
Following the filing of a petition for redetermination, the Tax
Court upheld the Commissioner’s position and found that the
investment advisory fees were not described in section 67(e)(1) and
31
were, therefore, subject to the 2% floor. The Tax Court stated that
“the thrust of the language of section 67(e) is that only those costs
which are unique to the administration of an estate or trust are to be
deducted from gross income without being subject to the 2-percent
32
floor on itemized deductions set forth at section 67(a).”
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
33
reversed. It based its reasoning on a fiduciary’s responsibility to
invest and manage trust assets as a “prudent investor” would manage
34
his own assets. The Sixth Circuit found that where a trustee lacks
experience in investment matters, his fiduciary duties require him to
retain the services of an investment advisor so as not to put the trust
35
assets at risk. Because the investment advisory fees were caused by
asserted, the taxpayer’s only remedy is a deficiency proceeding in the Tax Court. Id.
28. 994 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1993), abrogated by Knight v. Comm’r, 552 U.S. 181
(2008).
29. Id. at 303. In 1987, the market value of the O’Neill Trust exceeded $4.5
million. Id. From 1979 to 1991, the co-trustees had engaged Hamilton & Allen (f.k.a.
Allen & Leavy Investment Management, Inc.) to provide investment management
services for the O’Neill Trust. Id.
30. Id. The result of the Commissioner’s findings increased the O’Neill Trust’s
taxable income by $9180. Id.
31. Id. at 304.
32. Id.(quotations omitted).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 304.
35. Id. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227
reporter’s notes (1990) (“The prudent investor rule of this Section has its origins in
the dictum of Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick. (26 Mass) 446, 461 (1830), stating that
trustees must ‘observe how men of prudence, discretion, and intelligence manage
their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent
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the fiduciary duties of the co-trustees, the Sixth Circuit found that the
fees were incurred in connection with the administration of the trust
and were, therefore, fully deductible and not subject to the 2% floor
36
of section 67(a).
Subsequent to the ruling of the Sixth Circuit, the IRS
nonacquiesced but opted not to seek certiorari due to the lack of
37
conflict among the circuit courts of appeals. The IRS did, however,
encourage parties in other circuits to follow the Tax Court’s opinion
38
in hopes of developing inter-circuit conflict. The IRS would soon
get their wish as the O’Neill opinion marked the first—and last—time
that a circuit court would agree with the taxpayer’s position on the
39
deductibility of investment advisory fees by trusts. In 2000, the Court
40
of Federal Claims agreed with the IRS’s position.
2.

The Federal Circuit: Mellon Bank v. United States

In the years 1989 through 1992, Mellon Bank filed fiduciary
income tax returns for thirteen trusts created for the benefit of
41
members of the Richard K. Mellon family. In each of these years
Mellon Bank applied the 2% floor to the investment management
42
fees incurred by the trusts. Relying on O’Neill v. Commissioner of
43
Internal Revenue, in October 1993, Mellon bank filed an amended
fiduciary income tax return seeking a consolidated tax refund of
44
income taxes paid in years 1989 through 1992. The IRS denied the
disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable
safety of the capital to be invested.’”).
36. O’Neill, 994 F.2d at 304. This line of reasoning would later be put forth by
the trustee in Knight v. Commissioner and be referred to as the “straightforward
causation test.” Knight v. Comm’r, 552 U.S. 181, 189 (2008).
37. O’Neill, 994 F.2d 302, action on dec., 1994-06 (Sept. 12, 1994) (providing
direction as to how taxpayers should approach this decision: “[t]he Service agrees
with the Tax Court and disagrees with the Sixth Circuit. No petition for a writ of
certiorari was filed, however, in the absence of intercircuit conflict. Deductions for
fees for investment advice incurred by trusts or estates should continue to be subject
to the 2[%] floor in section 67 outside the Sixth Circuit. While the Sixth Circuit’s
decision should be followed there, the Tax Court opinion should be followed in other
circuits in hope of developing intercircuit conflict.”).
38. Id.
39. Philip N. Jones, Supreme Court Rules—Negatively—on Deductibility of Trust
Investment Advisor Fees, 108 J. TAX’N 72, 73 (2008).
40. Id.
41. Mellon Bank v. United States, 265 F.3d 1275, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
42. Jones, supra note 39, at 73.
43. 994 F.2d 302 (6th Cir.1993), abrogated by Knight v. Comm’r, 552 U.S. 181
(2008).
44. Mellon, 265 F.3d at 1278.
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refund claim, and the bank filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims.
46
After the submission of stipulated facts, the trial court entered
47
judgment on the merits in favor of the United States. Taking issue
with the trial court’s construction of the statute, Mellon Bank
48
appealed.
49
It was undisputed that trustee fees are fully deductible. Mellon
Bank maintained that the “trustee fees are merely a label for fiduciary
50
services performed by the trustee.” It argued that because these
fiduciary services are required by law, any services that are delegated
by the trustee—specifically, investment advisory fees—would remain
subject to fiduciary standards and are, therefore, trustee fees fully
51
deductible under section 67(e)(1).
The question addressed by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit was whether the Court of Federal Claims, in
rejecting Mellon Bank’s interpretation, properly interpreted the
second requirement of section 67(e)(1) to mean that a trustee’s costs
are subject to the 2% floor established by section 67(a) unless the
costs occur only in the context of trust administration and are not
52
routinely incurred by individual investors. The Federal Circuit found
53
that that it had and affirmed.
In doing so, the Federal Circuit looked closely at the two-pronged
54
test of section 67(e)(1). The first prong of the test states that fees
are fully deductible if they are “costs which are paid or incurred in
55
connection with the administration of the estate or trust.” The
court stated that this prong serves as a prerequisite which defines the
56
relationship between the costs and the administration of the trust. It
45. Id. Following the initiation of the suit in the Court of Federal Claims, both
parties filed motions for summary judgment. Id. Both motions were subsequently
denied by the court. Id. The court denied the government’s motion because they
found that there were material issues of fact as to whether certain expenditures
deducted by the bank would not have been incurred if the property were not held in
a trust. Id. The court rejected Mellon Bank’s interpretation of section 67(e)(1) and
therefore denied its motion. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1279.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1281–82.
54. Id. at 1280–81.
55. I.R.C. § 67(e)(1) (2010).
56. Mellon, 265 F.3d at 1280.
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logically follows that all expenses resulting from the fiduciary
57
obligations of the trustee satisfy this prerequisite. It is at this point
that the court rejected Mellon Bank’s interpretation. Under the
bank’s interpretation, this is where the analysis would stop because
the bank argues that trustee fees are merely a label for fiduciary
58
costs. Therefore all expenses incurred by a trustee in connection
59
with the administration of a trust would be fully deductible. This
interpretation, however, would eliminate the second prong of section
67(e)(1), which is directed to the question of whether an expense
would not have been incurred if the property had not been held in
60
trust.
The court refused to adopt Mellon Bank’s interpretation because
61
it would render the second prong of section 67(e)(1) superfluous.
Instead it found that the second prong served as a filter that allowed a
full deduction only if such fees were costs that “would not have been
62
incurred if the property were not held in such trust or estate.” This
requirement did not focus on the “relationship between the trust and
costs, but the type of costs, and whether those costs would have been
63
incurred” had the assets been held outside of a trust. The second
prong, therefore, “treats as fully deductible only those trust-related
administrative expenses that are unique to the administration of a trust
64
and not customarily incurred outside of trusts.” Investment advisory
fees, the court found, are commonly incurred outside of trusts and
are therefore not exempt under section 67(e)(1) and are subject to
65
the 2% floor of section 67(a).

57. Id.
58. Id. at 1279.
59. Id. at 1280.
60. I.R.C. § 67(e)(1) (2010).
61. Id. “Our interpretation, however, must give full effect to the entire statute,
not merely the first clause.” Mellon, 265 F.3d at 1280 (citing Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523
U.S. 57, 62 (1998) (“[W]e are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional
enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same law.”)).
62. Mellon, 265 F.3d at 1280.
63. Id. at 1281.
64. Id (emphasis added).
65. Id. In the last paragraph of its opinion, the Federal Circuit noted that
Mellon Bank “had chosen to retain an outside investment advisor,” and thus they
“must accept the tax consequences of that decision.” Jones, supra note 39, at 73. This
comment seems to imply “that the bank’s fees would have been fully deductible had
the bank bundled all of its fees into a single trustee’s fee.” Id.
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The Fourth Circuit: Scott v. United States

On October 16, 1944, the Bryan Trust was established under the
67
last will and testament of John Stewart Bryan. The Bryan Trust was
68
established for the benefit of John Bryan’s four granddaughters.
The Trust authorized its trustees to employ investment advisors and to
69
pay those advisors reasonable fees for their services. Consistent with
70
this authorization, the trustees of the Bryan Trust, three attorneys,
retained the investment-counseling firm of Brundage, Sotry and Rose,
71
LLC (Brundage). During the tax years at issue in this case, 1996 and
1997, the Bryan Trust held assets worth approximately $25 million. In
1996 and 1997, respectively, the Trust paid Brundage $107,055 and
72
$119,943 in investment advisory fees. In addition to the investment
advisory fees, “the Trust also paid custodian fees, trustees’ fees, and
fees for the preparation of [fiduciary] income tax returns and
73
accountings.”
On both the 1996 and 1997 fiduciary income tax returns, the
taxpayers reported the investment advisory fees paid to Brundage as
“‘other deductions,’ not subject to the 2% floor for miscellaneous
74
itemized deductions.” Following an audit, the “IRS determined that
the investment . . . [advisory] fees were . . . miscellaneous itemized de75
ductions subject to the 2% floor” and issued a notice of deficiency.
In 2000, the taxpayers paid the deficiency and, after their refund
claim was denied by the IRS, filed a refund suit in Federal District
76
Court.
The Government filed a motion for summary judgment relying
77
on the Federal Circuit’s decision in Mellon Bank. The taxpayers then
filed a cross motion for summary judgment relying on the Sixth
66. Scott v. United States, 328 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 2003).
67. Id. at 135. The Trust was established under Virginia law. Id.
68. Id. “These granddaughters include[d] taxpayers Shelah K. Scott, Hope S.
Childs, and Anne K. McGuire.” Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 136. The income beneficiaries of the trust all claimed that the trustees
all lacked expertise in the investment of large sums of money and would not have
served without an outside investment advisor. Id.
71. Id. at 135.
72. Id. at 136.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. The taxpayers each filed their own refund suits in the Eastern District of
Virginia. These suits were consolidated immediately after they were filed. Id.
77. Id.
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78

Circuit’s decision in O’Neill. “At oral argument on the motions, the
79
court raised a new issue” regarding the immunity Virginia law
“afforded . . . to trustees who invest trust assets in a statutory list of
80
approved investments.” “After further briefing and argument” on
this statutory immunity issue, “the court granted the Government’s
81
motion for summary judgment.” The court reasoned that because
trustees had access to this list of investments, and would be immune
from liability for any losses or damages if these investments were used,
82
an investment advisor was not required.
Because retaining an
investment advisor to manage the trust assets was not required under
the trustees’ fiduciary duty, the court found the associated fees to be
83
subject to the 2% floor of section 67(a).
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling
84
85
but on different grounds. Rather than relying on Virginia law, the
court focused on the commonality in which investment advisory fees
86
are incurred by individuals and trusts. Relying on Mellon Bank, the
court stated simply that “trust-related administrative expenses are
subject to the 2% floor if they constitute expenses commonly incurred
87
by individual taxpayers.”
Because investment advisory fees are
commonly incurred outside the context of trust administration, they
88
are, therefore, subject to the 2% floor. The court also noted what it

78. Id.
79. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-45.3, 45.14 (2009).
80. Scott, 328 F.3d at 136. “The court sought additional briefing on the potential
impact of that immunity on the deductibility of investment-advice fees.” Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 137.
83. Id. “The [district] court acknowledged that investments authorized by the
Virginia legal list might not be the best investments from a financial perspective and
that trustees ‘would probably be better served’ by seeking investment advice.” Id.
84. Id. at 140.
85. The Fourth Circuit was right to base its decision on other grounds. Basing
the outcome of a federal income tax question on state law, when not expressly
authorized, runs contrary to settled precedent. See Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 194
(1938) (“In dealing with the meaning and application of an act of Congress enacted
in the exercise of its plenary power under the Constitution to tax income . . . it is the
will of Congress which controls, and the expression of its will, in the absence of
language evidencing a different purpose, should be interpreted so as to give a
uniform application to a nationwide scheme of taxation. . . . Congress establishes its
own criteria and the state law may control only when the federal taxing act by express
language or necessary implication makes its operation dependent upon state
law.”)(internal quotations omitted).
86. Scott, 328 F.3d at 140.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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saw as a “fatal flaw” of the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in O’Neill. The
test was not whether such costs were commonly incurred by trustees,
but rather whether such costs were commonly incurred outside of
90
trusts. The score was, therefore, two circuits to one in favor of the
IRS.
III. THE KNIGHT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. The Rudkin (Knight) Facts
Michael J. Knight (Knight) served as trustee of the William L.
Rudkin Testamentary Trust (trust) established in Connecticut under
91
the will of Henry A. Rudkin on April 14, 1967. The trust was initially
funded with proceeds from the sale of Pepperidge Farm to Campbell
92
Soup Company. The trustees and other fiduciaries were provided
93
with broad authority in the management of the trust property. The
trust authorized the trustees “to employ such agents, experts and
counsel as they may deem advisable in connection with the
administration and management of [the] estate and of any trust
94
created [thereunder].”
In 2000, Knight engaged Warfield Associates, Inc. (Warfield) to
95
provide investment management advice for the trust, which, at the
beginning of the tax year, held approximately $2.9 million in
96
marketable securities. On its Form 1041, U.S. Income Tax Return
for Estates and Trusts, for the year 2000, the trust reported total
97
income of $624,816. The fiduciary income tax return also reported,
among other things, a deduction of the Warfield investment
98
management fees totaling $22,241. This deduction was taken on

89. Id.
90. Id.; see also Jones, supra note 39, at 74.
91. William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Comm’r, 467 F.3d 149, 151 (2d Cir.
2006).
92. Id. Henry A. Rudkin’s family was involved in the founding of Pepperidge
Farm. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Comm’r, 124 T.C. 304, 305 (2005). Pepperidge
Farm was acquired by Campbell Soup Company in 1961. Pepperidge Farm: Our
History, http://www.pepperidgefarm.com/history.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
93. Rudkin, 124 T.C. at 305.
94. Id. at 306.
95. Id.
96. Knight v. Comm’r, 552 U.S. 181, 185 (2008).
97. Rudkin, 124 T.C. at 306. The Form 1041 for the 2000 year was timely filed on
behalf of the trust. Id.
98. Id.
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line 15a for “[o]ther deductions not subject to the 2% floor.” There
was no deduction claimed on line 15b for “[a]llowable miscellaneous
100
itemized deductions subject to the 2% floor.”
On December 5, 2003, the Commissioner of the IRS
(Commissioner) issued to the trust a statutory notice of deficiency for
101
the taxable year 2000.
The notice of deficiency indicated that it
rejected the trust’s itemized deduction for the investment advisory
102
fees in the amount of $22,241. Instead, the Commissioner allowed
deduction of the portion of the fees that exceeded 2% of the adjusted
103
gross income of $623,050. The amount found by the IRS to be in
104
excess of the 2% floor was $9780. The corresponding income tax
105
The trust subsequently filed a
deficiency amounted to $4448.
petition in Tax Court disputing the assessed deficiency.
B. Tax Court & Second Circuit Opinions: Rudkin v. Commissioner
In its petition to the Tax Court, the trustee argued that the fees
were paid in connection with administration of the trust and would
106
not have been incurred if the property were not held in trust. Like
the trustees in Mellon Bank, the trustees argued that even though an
individual may make a voluntary choice to engage an investment
advisor, “fiduciary duties render such professional advice a necessary
107
and ‘involuntary’ component of trust administration.”
The
involuntary nature of retaining an investment advisor to manage the
trust assets, the trustees claimed, arose out of their obligation to act as
a “prudent investor” under the Connecticut Uniform Prudent
108
Investor Act, which required the trustee to obtain investment
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. The Internal Revenue Service must assess any amount of alleged
underpayment of tax within three years after a taxpayer files the taxpayer’s return for
a year. JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 984.
102. Rudkin, 467 F.3d at 306.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. Following the notice of deficiency, both parties became aware that the
notice contained an error in its calculation of the trust’s adjusted gross income. Id. It
was then stipulated that the correct amount was $613,263, and, therefore, the
corresponding deduction for the investment management advisory fees would be
$9976. Id. “However, on account of the alternative minimum tax, the parties are in
further agreement that the resultant deficiency if respondent’s position is sustained
remains unchanged at $4,448.” Rudkin v. Comm’r, 124 T.C. 304, 306 (2005).
106. Rudkin, 124 T.C. at 308.
107. Id.
108. The legal duty of prudence has been codified in the Uniform Prudent
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109

advisory services, and, therefore, pay investment advisory fees.
The trustee took the position that the exception in section 67(e)
110
“establishes a straightforward causation test.” The proper inquiry,
the trustee argued, is whether a particular expense of a trust or estate
was caused by the fact that the property was held in the trust or
111
estate.
The investment advisory fees incurred by the trust,
therefore, met this test as “these costs [were] caused by the trustee’s
obligation to obtain advice on investing trust assets in compliance

Investor Act in 1994. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT §§ 1-16, 7B U.L.A. 1 (2006); see
also Brief of Am. Bankers Ass’n et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Knight v.
Comm’r, 581 U.S. 181 (2007) (No. 06-1286). Since 1994, versions of this uniform
statute have been adopted by a majority of states and the District of Columbia as the
standard for trust investment law. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.36.225–.260 (2008); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-10901 to -10909 (Supp. 2009); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 24-2-610 to
-619 (Supp. 2009); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 16045–16054 (West Supp. 2010); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 15-1.1-101 to -115 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 45a-541 to -541l (West 2004 & Supp. 2009); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 19-1309.01–.06
(LexisNexis 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 518.11 (West 2007 & Supp. 2010); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 554C-1 to -12 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§§ 68-501 to -514 (2006); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5, 5/5.1 (West 2007 & Supp.
2009); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 30-4-3.5-1 to -13 (West 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 633.4301–
.4309 (West 2003 & Supp. 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-24a01 to -24a19 (2006); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, §§ 901– 908 (West Supp. 2009); MD. CODE ANN.
§§ 14-405(c), 15-114(b)(LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
203C, §§ 1–11 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 700.1501–.1512 (West
2002 & Supp. 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 501B.151–.152 (West 2009 & Supp. 2010);
MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 469.900–.913 (West 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-34-601 to -610
(2009); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-3883 to -3889 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3 (McKinney 2008 & Supp. 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 164.705–.775 (LexisNexis 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 564-B:9-901 to -906
(LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:20-11.1–.12 (West Supp.
2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-7-601 to -612 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 36C-9-901 to -907 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 59-02-08.1–.11 (2004); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5809.01–.08 (West 2007 & Supp. 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60,
§§ 175.60–.72 (West Supp. 2010); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 130.750–.755 (West Supp. 2009);
20 PA. CONS. STA. ANN. §§ 7201–7214 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 1815-1 to -13 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Sess.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-933 (2009); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 55-5-6 to -16 (2004 & Supp. 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 35-14101 to -114 (West 2007); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 117.001–.012 (Vernon 2007 &
Supp. 2009); UTAH CODE. ANN. §§ 75-7-901 to -907 (West Supp. 2009); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 26-45.3–.14 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.100.010–.140 (West 2006 & Supp.
2010)); W. VA. CODE §§ 44-6C-1 to -15 (LexisNexis 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 881.01
(West 2002 & Supp. 2009)); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-10-901 to -913 (2009).
109. Knight v. Comm’r, 552 U.S. 181, 185-86 (2008). See also CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 45a-541a to -541 (2008).
110. Knight, 552 U.S. at 189. This “causation test” is the same test set forth by the
Sixth Circuit in O’Neil. See O’Neil v. Comm’r, 994 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1993), abrogated
by Knight v. Comm’r, 128 S. Ct. 782 (2008).
111. Knight, 552 U.S. at 189.
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112

with the Trustee’s fiduciary duties.”
The Commissioner, basing his arguments on Mellon Bank and
Scott, argued that because investment advisory fees are commonly
incurred by individual investors outside of trust administration, the
113
fees did not meet the second requirement of section 67(e)(1).
The Tax Court, finding its initial interpretation of section
114
67(e)(set forth in O’Neill v. Commissioner) and the ensuing decisions
of the Federal and Fourth circuits to be sound, held that the
deduction of the investment advisory fees were subject to the 2%
115
floor. The taxpayers subsequently appealed.
The Second Circuit, in a decision written by current Supreme
Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor, went a step further in its
interpretation of section 67(e) than either the Federal or Fourth
116
Circuit. In its analysis, the Second Circuit agreed with the Fourth
Circuit’s statement in Scott that the second prong of section 67(e)(1)
does not ask whether the costs at issue are commonly incurred in the
administration of trusts or are incurred as a result of a particular
trustee’s fiduciary duty. It instead focused on the hypothetical
117
situation where the assets are in the hands of an individual. It is at
this point, however, that the court departs from its sister circuits. The
court disagreed with the Federal and Fourth circuits’ statement that
costs “‘not customarily incurred outside of trusts’ are the ones not
118
subject to the [2%] floor.”
Instead, the court held that the plain
meaning of section 67(e) “permits a trust to take a full deduction only
for those costs that could not have been incurred by an individual
119
property owner.”
In reaching this standard, the Second Circuit reached a result
that had not been advanced by either party and was far more
112. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
113. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Comm’r, 124 T.C. 304, 308 (2005). The
Commissioner also argued that “neither State law nor the governing trust instrument
imposed a legal obligation on the fiduciary to obtain professional investment
management services.” Id. at 309. This is an argument put forth in response to the
question left unanswered by the Fourth Circuit in Scott v. United States, 328 F.3d 132
(4th Cir. 2003), regarding the effect of state law on this issue.
114. 98 T.C. 227, 230–31 (1992).
115. Rudkin, 124 T.C. at 311.
116. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Comm’r, 467 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2006).
117. Id. at 155.
118. Id. at 156 (emphasis added) (quoting Mellon Bank, N.A. v. United States,
265 F.3d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
119. Rudkin, 467 F.3d at 156. The court also found the statute’s text to be clear
and unambiguous and, therefore, refused to address the trustee’s legislative history
arguments. Id. at 157.
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120

restrictive than the position asserted by the IRS. Following this
holding, the taxpayer petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
121
The
certiorari, citing the clear conflict among the four circuits.
Department of Justice opposed certiorari, claiming that the conflict
122
would soon be resolved by forthcoming regulations. Unconvinced
by the Department of Justice’s claims, the Supreme Court granted
123
124
certiorari under the name Knight v. Commissioner in June 2007.
C. Proposed Treasury Regulations: Treasury’s Attempt to Get Out in Front
of the Supreme Court
On July 27, 2007, just over a month after the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to Rudkin, the IRS released proposed regulations
125
under section 67(e). The proposed regulations stated that “[t]o
the extent that a cost incurred by an estate or non-grantor trust is
unique to such an entity, that cost is not subject to the 2-percent floor
126
on miscellaneous itemized deductions.” The proposed regulations
defined costs as “unique” if “an individual could not have incurred
127
that cost in connection with property not held in an estate or trust.”
It is clear that the IRS was signaling to the Supreme Court their
approval of the Second Circuit’s narrow “could not have been
incurred” standard set forth by then-Judge Sotomayor.
The proposed regulations set forth a non-exclusive list of certain
products or services that the IRS considered “unique” and fully
128
deductible. These products or services included:
Fiduciary accountings; judicial or quasi-judicial filings
required as part of the administration of the estate or trust;
fiduciary income tax and estate tax returns; the division or
distribution of income or corpus to or among beneficiaries;
trust or will contest or construction; fiduciary bond
premiums; and communications with beneficiaries
129
regarding estate or trust matters.

120. Jones, supra note 39, at 74.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 552 U.S. 181 (2008).
124. Jones, supra note 39, at 74.
125. Section 67 Limitations on Estates and Trusts, 72 Fed. Reg. 41,243, 41,245
(proposed July 27, 2007).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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The IRS also set forth a non-exclusive list of non-unique products
130
These non-unique
or services that are subject to the 2% floor.
products and services included: “Custody or management of property;
advice on investing for total return; gift tax returns; the defense of
claims by creditors of the decedent or grantor; and the purchase, sale,
maintenance, repair, insurance or management of non-trade or
131
business property.”
One example included in that list has been heavily debated: the
inclusion of costs associated with the preparation of fiduciary income
tax returns. This issue will be discussed in more detail following the
discussion of the Knight decision as the IRS may be forced to alter its
position taken on this issue in light of the Supreme Court’s holding.
In addition to setting forth the “unique” standard to test the
deductibility of trust costs, the proposed regulations also touched on
an issue that has been percolating in the background for much of this
section 67 litigation and that has now become a very hot topic among
corporate fiduciaries —that being how “bundled fees” are to be
treated going forward. The proposed regulations addressed the issue
as follows:
(c) “Bundled fees.” If an estate or a non-grantor trust pays a
single fee, commission or other expense for both costs that
are unique to estates and trusts and costs that are not, then
the estate or non-grantor trust must identify the portion (if
any) of the legal, accounting, investment advisory, appraisal
or other fee, commission or expense that is unique to estates
and trusts and is thus not subject to the 2-percent floor. The
taxpayer must use any reasonable method to allocate the
single fee, commission or expense between the costs unique
132
to estates and trusts and other costs.
This has been a hot topic as most corporate fiduciaries do not
133
charge separately for their services. Instead, most trustees bundle
their services and charge a fee based on a percentage of the value of
134
the trust assets. This bundled fee represents compensation for all
fiduciary services, including acting as a custodian for the trust assets,
investing the trust assets, filing the trust’s income tax returns,
communicating with beneficiaries, and handling any necessary court
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. RONALD D. AUCUTT, TRUSTS AND THE 2% FLOOR 10 (McGuire Woods L.L.P
2008), http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/publications/taxation/trusts.pdf.
134. Id.
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135

filings. Under the current practice, the bundled fiduciary fees are
136
fully deductible. The effect of “unbundling” fiduciary fees will be
discussed later in this article, but one can already imagine the
potential challenges and substantial costs associated with requiring
corporate fiduciaries to unbundle their fees and separate them into
unique and non-unique expenses.
IV. THE KNIGHT DECISION
In an opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Supreme
Court found in favor of the Commissioner but for different reasons
137
than those given by the Court of Appeals. The Court initiated its
138
analysis by reviewing the language of section 67(e). It immediately
took issue with the Second Circuit’s application of the statute, as in
the Second Circuit’s analysis the court asked whether the cost at issue
139
could have been incurred by an individual. This, the Court found,
140
“flies in the face of the statutory language” of section 67(e). The
language of the statute does not ask whether the costs “could not have
been incurred” were it not held in trust but instead asks whether the
costs “would not have been incurred if the property were not held” in
141
trust. The Court stated that “[t]he fact that an individual could not
do something is one reason he would not, but not the only possible
142
reason.” If Congress had intended the narrow application adopted
by the Second Circuit, “it easily could have replaced ‘would’ in the
143
statute with ‘could,’ and presumably would have.” The Court found
this fact to be strong support for rejecting the Second Circuit’s
144
interpretation of section 67(e).
135. Id. For example, under this proposed approach, if 30% of a trustee’s fee is
allocable to fiduciary bonds and accountings, fiduciary income tax returns, and
distributions and communications to beneficiaries, while 70% of the fee is allocable
to custody, management, and investment advice, then only 30% of the fee will be fully
deductible as an “above the line” expense [not subject to the 2% floor], and the
other 70% will be deductible only to the extent it exceeds 2% of the trust’s equivalent
of “adjusted gross income.” Id. (alteration in original).
136. Notice 2008-32, 2008-11 I.R.B. 578, at 594.
137. Knight v. Comm’r, 552 U.S. 181, 183 (2008).
138. Id. at 187–88.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 188 (internal quotation omitted).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. The Court also went on to find that the Second Circuit’s interpretation of
section 67(e) would render the first clause of Section 67(e)(1) superfluous. Id. at
188–89. “If the only costs that are fully deductible are those that could not be
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The Court also rejected the “causation test” for deductibility set
145
This causation test, adopted from the Sixth
forth by the trustee.
Circuit’s opinion in O’Neil, sets forth the proposition that all fees
incurred in connection with, or caused by, the trustee’s fiduciary
duties are fully deductible and, therefore, not subject to the 2%
146
floor. This interpretation, however, would allow nearly every cost
incurred by a trustee to escape the 2% floor of section 67 because a
147
trustee has a fiduciary duty to incur them.
Furthermore, the court found that the adoption of this causation
148
test would render the second clause of section 67(e) superfluous. If
section 67(e) set forth a straightforward causation test, then only the
first clause of section 67(e)(1) —providing that the cost be “incurred
in connection with the administration of the . . . trust” —would be
149
necessary.
The second clause of section 67(e)(1) —that the cost
also be one “which would not have been incurred if the property were
not held in such trust” —would be redundant and, ultimately,
150
unnecessary.
After rejecting the trustee’s causation test approach, the Court
moved on to introduce what it found as the correct approach to
section 67(e). Section 67(e), the Court found, invites a “hypothetical
inquiry into the treatment of the property were it held outside a
151
trust.”
It is the “counterfactual question of whether individuals
would have incurred such costs in the absence of a trust” that should

incurred outside the trust context,” then there would be no reason to include an
additional condition on full deductibility that the costs be incurred in connection
with the trust’s administration. Id. at 189. “We can think of no expense that could be
incurred exclusively by a trust but would nevertheless not be ‘paid or incurred in
connection with’ its administration.” Id.
145. Id.
146. See O’Neill v. Comm’r, 994 F.2d 302, 304 (6th Cir. 1993).
147. Knight, 552 U.S. at 188.
148. Id. at 190.
149. Id.
150. Id. In addition to rendering the second clause of section 67(e)(1)
superfluous, the Court also found that the trustee’s position was “further
undermined by [the Court’s] inclination, ‘[i]n construing provisions . . . in which a
general statement of policy is qualified by an exception, [to] read the exception
narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the provision.’” Id. (quoting
Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989)). The general rule set forth by section
67(e) is that gross income of an estate or trust shall be computed in the same manner
as an individual. Id. at 191. Under the trustee’s interpretation, the exception set
forth in section 67(e)(1) would swallow the general rule as most, if not all, expenses
incurred by a trust would be fully deductible. Id.
151. Id.
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152

be the focus of any section 67(e) analysis.
This hypothetical
counterfactual approach fits squarely with the test adopted by the
Fourth and Federal circuits: “Costs incurred by trusts that escape the
2% floor are those that would not ‘commonly’ or ‘customarily’ be
153
incurred by individuals.” It is this test that the Court adopted for
154
determining the tax deductibility of trust or estate expenses.
Having established the correct standard in which to approach
section 67(e), the Court proceeded to address the particular issue of
the case before them— “ whether investment advisory fees incurred by
155
a trust escape the 2% floor” of section 67.
Consistent with the
standard articulated above, the Court seemed to cut the trustee’s legs
out from under him as it stated that the trustee, who had the burden
of establishing his entitlement to the deduction, had failed to
demonstrate that it is uncommon or unusual for individuals to hire an
156
investment advisor. The foundation of the trustee’s argument was
that “he engaged an investment adviser because of his fiduciary
duties” to act as a prudent investor under Connecticut’s Uniform
157
Prudent Investor Act. To satisfy the prudent investor standard, a
152. Id. (emphasis in original).
153. Id. (citing Scott v. United States, 328 F.3d 132, 140 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Put
simply, trust-related administrative expenses are subject to the 2% floor if they
constitute expenses commonly incurred by individual taxpayers.”); Mellon Bank, N.A.
v. United States, 265 F.3d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Section 67(e) “treats as fully
deductible only those trust-related administrative expenses that are unique to the
administration of a trust and not customarily incurred outside of trusts.”)).
154. Id. Although the solicitor general advocated for the adoption of the Second
Circuit’s “could not have been incurred” standard, he also accepted the Fourth and
Federal circuits’ test as an alternative reading of section 67(e). Id. at 188 n.3, 191.
155. Id. at 192.
156. Id. (citing INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992)(noting the
“‘familiar rule’ that ‘an income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace and that
the burden of clearly showing the right to the claimed deduction is on the taxpayer’”
(quoting Interstate Transit Lines v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943)))). The Court,
however, subsequently acknowledged that the reason the trustee had not
demonstrated this fact was because the trustee’s argument was not that individuals do
not commonly incur investment advisory fees, but that individuals cannot incur trust
investment advisory fees. Id. at 193. It seems odd that the Chief Justice would
highlight the trustee’s failure to demonstrate this particular fact, and then provide an
explanation for why it had not attempted to do so. At first blush, it seems as though
the Chief Justice may have been alluding to the fact that there is no difference
between trust investment advisory fees and individual investment advisory fees.
However, in the last paragraph of the opinion he acknowledges that it may be
conceivable that some trust-related investment advisory fees may be fully deductible,
and therefore different from individual investment advisory fees. Id. at 194-95.
Regardless of the dicta in the last paragraph, it seems that the Court is deferring to
the IRS and the Treasury will make the final determination.
157. Id. at 193.
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trustee “must ‘invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor
would, by considering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements
158
“[T]he standard looks to
and other circumstances of the trust.’”
what a prudent investor with the same investment objectives handling
159
his own affairs would do . . . .”
The Court did not doubt the trustee’s claim that a hypothetical
prudent investor in the trustee’s position would have solicited
160
investment advice. In fact, this claim seemed to further support the
Court’s position, as it concluded:
Having accepted all this, it is quite difficult to say that
investment advisory fees ‘would not have been incurred’ —
that is, that it would be unusual or uncommon for such fees
to have been incurred—if the property were held by an
individual investor with the same objectives as the Trust in
161
handling his own affairs.
The Court did, however, leave open the possibility that “some
trust-related investment advisory fees may be fully deductible ‘if an
investment advisor were to impose a special, additional charge
162
It was found to be
applicable only to its fiduciary accounts.’”
conceivable “that a trust may have an unusual investment objective, or
may require a specialized balancing of the interests of various parties,
such that a reasonable comparison with individual investors would be
163
improper.” In this situation “the incremental cost of expert advice
158. Id. (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-541b(a) (2007)) (emphasis in original).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 193–94.
161. Id. at 194.
162. Id. (quoting Brief for the Respondent at 25, Knight v. Comm’r, No. 06-1286
(U.S. Oct. 11, 2007)).
163. Id. at 194–95. Theoretically this argument makes sense. However, in
practice, the balancing of interests between current income beneficiaries and
remainder beneficiaries is not primarily done by the investment manager; instead
they are balanced through the decisions made by the trust administrator. The
following is an example of this: Often, non-grantor trusts will have a named income
beneficiary to whom the trustee is required to pay out 100% of the net income and
principal (corpus) for certain expenses, but at the discretion of the trustee. Such a
trust will also have remainder beneficiaries who will receive the balance of the trust
upon the death of the income beneficiary. In such a situation, the income
beneficiary may be an elder individual whose primary interest is income. The trustee
would then work with the investment manager to set up an appropriate investment
objective for the trust which would both provide as much income as possible for the
income beneficiary, but also provide some opportunity for growth for the remainder
beneficiaries. This is the balancing of interests that the Chief Justice was referring to.
The problem with this example, however, is that the investment manager will simply
assign an investment objective similar to that of an individual with the same goal—
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beyond what would normally be required for the ordinary taxpayer
164
In the present case,
would not be subject to the 2% floor.”
however, the Court found that the trustee had not asserted that the
investment advisory services were distinctive and therefore the fees
associated with these services were subject to the 2% floor of section
165
67.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE KNIGHT DECISION
A. Analysis
When all is said and done, the Chief Justice did what he could
with what is, at the end of the day, a terribly written code section. In
rejecting the Second Circuit’s interpretation of section 67(e), the
Court found that “[i]f Congress had intended . . . [such a] reading, it
easily could have replaced ‘would’ in the statute with ‘could,’ and
166
presumably would have.” The Court likely gives Congress too much
credit. In its brief to the Supreme Court, the Respondent concedes
that “there is no meaningful discussion of Section 67(e)(1) itself in
167
the legislative history.”
This seems to make perfect sense as even
some meaningful discussion or debate over the language of this section
would have highlighted the interpretive problems that result from the
inclusion of “would” in this code section and the possible problems
associated with trustees applying a hypothetical counterfactual to
determine the tax deductibility of certain trust expenses. Regardless
of the poor drafting of this particular section, the Court was right to
168
restrain itself from making a judicial amendment of the statute.
Instead, the Court adopted the standard applied by the Fourth
169
and Federal circuits.
At first glance, this standard seems to
that being a majority focus on income production with a slight equity holding for
growth. Investment industry standards do not provide for specific fiduciary, interest
balancing, investment objectives utilized by investment advisors. Instead, the
balancing of different beneficiaries’ interests is primarily done by the trustee who
helps establish a particular investment objective and makes discretionary decisions for
how principal distributions will be made.
164. Id. at 195.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 182.
167. Brief for the Respondent at 33, Knight v. Comm’r, No. 06-1286 (U.S. Oct. 11,
2007).
168. Knight, 552 U.S. at 194 (“Congress’s decision to phrase the pertinent inquiry
in terms of a prediction about a hypothetical situation inevitably entails some
uncertainty, but that is no excuse for judicial amendment of the statute.”).
169. Id. at 191.
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articulate a middle ground between the standard adopted by the
Second Circuit (supported by the IRS) and the standard advocated by
the trustee. However, upon further review, the narrow standard
adopted by the Second Circuit and the moderate standard adopted by
the Court will likely have the same practical effect on what trust
expenses are found to be subject to the 2% floor.
The “could not have been incurred” standard advanced by the
IRS is clearly the narrowest interpretation of section 67(e). This
interpretation would allow only costs which are unique to trust and
estate administration — and unable to be incurred by individuals
holding similar assets—to be fully deductible. The fact that the IRS
advanced this interpretation should be of no surprise as this position
would limit the number of deductions, thereby yielding higher tax
revenue.
The causation test advocated by the trustee, on the other hand, is
as broad a standard as can be applied to questions of tax deductibility.
This test would allow any expense incurred by the trust to be fully
deductible if the expense could be shown to result from the trustee’s
fiduciary duties. The Court was correct in its criticism of the trustee’s
170
position because nearly every trust expense is incurred as the result
of some fiduciary duty of the trustee. Adoption of this test would
allow nearly every trust expense to escape the 2% floor of section 67.
In the middle lay the “not commonly or customarily incurred”
171
standard adopted by the Supreme Court. After reading the Chief
Justice’s opinion, this standard would seem to allow more to escape
the 2% floor than that of the Second Circuit’s standard, but would
also limit expenses not unique to trust administration to those not
commonly or customarily incurred by individuals, which is a narrower
scope than that of the causation test. Herein lies the problem. In
practice there are very few expenses incurred by non-grantor trusts
that are not unique to trust administration and that are also not
commonly or customarily incurred by individuals holding the same or
similar assets. The only expenses likely to fall into this category are
those associated with the services of specialty asset managers.
Specialty asset managers are responsible for the administration
and management of non-financial assets held in trusts. Examples of
specialty assets that fall outside the classification of standard financial
assets are real estate, closely held business interests, farm/ranch

170.
171.

See id. at 189–91.
See id. at 191.
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172

property, and oil, gas, and mineral interests.
Non-grantor trusts
with corporate fiduciaries as named trustees commonly use specialty
asset managers to handle these types of assets. The expenses
associated with the services of specialty asset managers are different
from trust administration fees as they are not incurred as the result of
the asset being held in trust. Instead, they are more akin to
investment advisory fees as they are typically incurred as the result of
the fiduciary duty of the trustee. Unlike investment advisory fees,
specialty asset management fees are not necessarily commonly or
customarily incurred by individuals who hold the same or similar
assets.
For example, a non-grantor trust being managed by a corporate
trustee that holds an interest in a closely-held business will often have
a specialty asset manager or business advisor handle any number of
issues related to the closely-held business such as business valuation,
succession planning, asset management, or even sales services. Would
these specialty asset manager/business advisory fees be fully
deductible under the standard set forth in Knight? On the one hand,
they are not trust specific expenses, but on the other hand, they are
not nearly as commonly incurred as investment advisory fees, for
example. This would seem to be the uncommon example of a fee
that would be subject to the 2% floor under the Second Circuit’s
standard, yet would be fully deductible under the standard adopted in
Knight.
Under the current common practice, however, the trust’s
fiduciary income tax preparer would not even conduct this analysis
because most specialty asset management fees are bundled into one
173
fee along with the trust administration and investment advisory fees.
If trustees are not required to unbundle their trust management fees,
then the practical outcome of the standard adopted in Knight will be
no different than the narrow standard advocated by the IRS. It
logically follows that, in order to effectuate the goals of the standard

172. See J.P. Morgan, Specialty asset management, http://www.jpmorgan.com/
pages/jpmorgan/private_banking/foundations/specialty_asset_management (last
visited Apr. 11, 2010); Wells Fargo, Real Estate & Specialty Assets,
https://www.wellsfargo.com/investing/pcs/business/assets (last visited Apr. 11,
2010).
173. See Wells Fargo Investment Management & Trust Fee Schedule (Effective
Date Oct. 2006)(on file with author). It is important to note that corporate trustees
who utilize this type of bundled fee typically reserve the right to charge special fees
for extraordinary services —beyond or in place of the bundled fee—resulting from
the management of these specialty assets. Id. at 2.
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adopted by the Court in Knight, the Department of the Treasury
must —to the dismay of all corporate fiduciaries—issue finalized
regulations requiring some form of unbundling trust management
fees. This is a logical conclusion to reach after analyzing the different
standards articulated by each court and applying them to the practical
aspects of trust administration.
There is, however, another possible conclusion that one can
reach with regard to the language of section 67(e)(1). To reach this
conclusion, one must take a step back and disregard the legal
arguments set forth by each side above and read the following passage
as an individual with no legal training would:
[T]he deductions for costs which are paid or incurred in
connection with the administration of . . . the trust and
which would not have been incurred if the property were
not held in such trust . . . shall be treated as allowable in
174
arriving at adjusted gross income.
Is it possible that the “which would not have been incurred if the
property were held in such trust” clause of section 67(e)(1) has been
overstated by parties and courts as a “second prong” of a statutory
175
test? With the acknowledged absence of any Congressional intent
to establish such a statutory test, it seems entirely possible that this
“second prong” is nothing more than a completion of the overall
176
thought of a relationship to trust administration. But faced with
diverging circuit court standards, the Supreme Court was forced to
make sense of a senseless statute. And instead of judicially amending
the statute itself, the Court adopted a standard which, in the end,
affords the Treasury substantial latitude in its application. This
latitude exists in the Treasury’s ability to define what constitutes
“common” and “customary” in its regulations to section 67.
Some commentators argue that by adopting this standard, the
Court simply added to the confusion surrounding the exception
177
rather than clarifying its application. Instead, the Court’s position
can be interpreted as simply laying out the boundaries of the
Treasury’s future regulations. The Treasury and IRS now have an
opportunity to step back from the proposed regulations released in
July 2007 and work on articulating an application of the statute,
174. I.R.C. § 67(e)(1) (2010).
175. AUCUTT, supra note 133, at 19.
176. Id.
177. Lindsay Roshkind, Interpreting I.R.C. § 67(E): The Supreme Court’s Attempt to
Nail Investment Advisory Fees to the “Floor,” 60 FLA. L. REV. 961, 970 (2008).
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consistent with the fairly broad guidance provided in the Knight
opinion. This course of action is fair, cost-effective, and
administratively feasible for the IRS and fiduciaries alike.
B. IRS and Treasury Interim Guidance
On February 27, 2008, following the decision in Knight, the IRS
issued Notice 2008-32, which provided interim guidance on the
178
treatment of investment advisory fees under section 67. The Notice
extended a grace period in which taxpayers would not be required to
unbundle fiduciary fees for any taxable years beginning before
179
January 1, 2008.
In addition to extending this grace period, the
Notice also requested that comments be submitted by interested
180
parties.
Many comments were filed in response to the Treasury’s
181
request. Generally, these comments asserted that the unbundling
182
of fiduciary fees should not be required and, in any event, that the

178.
179.
180.
181.

Notice 2008-32, 2008-11 I.R.B. 593.
Id. at 594.
Id.
Roy M. Adams, Coping With Change—Like It or Not, 17TH ANN. EST. &
CHARITABLE GIFT PLAN. INST., Sept. 14, 2009, at 71.
182. Id. The Committee on Estate and Gift Taxation of the New York City Bar
Association also took the following positions:
1. The Proposed Regulations’ requirement that bundled fees be
unbundled should be eliminated as it is contrary to Section 67(e) and the
view expressed by each of the federal courts that have commented on the
deductibility of trustees’ fees.
2. If, however, the Service is not inclined to eliminate its unbundling
requirement, then a trust or estate should be allowed to deduct without
regard to the 2% floor the portion of its bundled fiduciary fee that would
not be commonly incurred by individuals, as determined based upon the
fiduciary’s books and records and using any reasonable method of
allocation that the fiduciary may select. The fiduciary’s determination may
take into account the exceptions set forth near the end of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Knight, including for special additional charges that are
applicable only to fiduciary accounts, and the incremental cost of expert
advice beyond what would normally be incurred by individuals.
3. As an alternative to providing allocations based upon its books and
records, a fiduciary should also be allowed a safe harbor to deduct without
regard to the 2% floor the greater of [A] the amount of the total fiduciary
commissions that would be allowed under the applicable state statute
governing the commissions of individual fiduciaries, [B] a specified
percentage of the fiduciary commissions (such as 50%) to be determined by
the Service, and [C] the amount of the allocations to fully deductible costs
based upon the fiduciary’s generally applicable published fee schedule.
Id. at 71–72.
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IRS should provide guidance to clarify that neither taxpayers nor tax
practitioners will be subject to penalties relating to 2% floor issues
unless the taxpayer’s position has no realistic possibility of being
183
sustained on its merits.
The comments against the proposed regulations’ unbundling
requirement differentiated unitary (bundled) fees from the
investment advisory fees—those which were found to be subject to
the 2% floor in Knight— by arguing that the unitary fees were simply
184
fiduciary fees, which have always been held to be fully deductible
and, in what seems to be a throwaway argument, that nothing in the
Court’s opinion in Knight, or in section 67(e) itself, specifically
requires unbundling. Advocates of this position point to the fact that
fiduciary income tax return preparer fees are fully deductible under
section 67(e), whereas individual tax return preparer fees are subject
185
to the 2% floor. But is it really enough to say that these fees are
unique because the fiduciary must file a Form 1041 but an individual
must file a Form 1040? Although the Supreme Court did not focus on
preparer fees in Knight, the justices expressed some trepidation about
186
this line of reasoning during oral arguments in that case. Justice
183. Id. at 72. Significant changes to tax return preparer penalties were made
when Congress enacted the Small Business and Work Opportunity Act of 2007.
Specifically, the new standard requires that a tax return position be disclosed unless
there is ‘reasonable belief that the [filing] position would more likely than not be
sustained on its merits.’ This is a fairly significant step up in comparison to the
previous ‘good faith’ standard. See Craig L. Janes, Between Monsters—The Section 67(e)
Prop. Regs. And Section 6694, 35 EST. PLAN. 19 (2008).
184. Adams & Hoyt, supra note 181, at 72.
185. Craig L. Janes, supra note 183, at 19.
186. The Court did not address deductibility of fiduciary tax preparation fees in
the opinion, but the issue was discussed in oral arguments. See Knight v. Comm’r, 552
U.S. 181 (2008). The following is an excerpt from oral arguments in which Justice
Souter addressed attorney Eric Miller, an assistant to the Solicitor General, who
represented the IRS:
JUSTICE SOUTER: Yes, but it’s the individual who has to file the 1040.
What the trustee is filing is the 1041. And—I was going to ask the same
question that Justice Alito did, and that is why do you place so much
significance either in the label, i.e., it’s fiduciary return, or in peculiar fact
that it is a fiduciary who is filing that return?
It’s a tax return and—and I think your—the government’s argument is
that with respect to —to other items that may be disputed, you should
regard them at a fairly general level, i.e., investment advice, not fiduciary
investment advice. But when you come to the tax return, you don’t regard
it as a general— at a general level; you regard it at a very specific level, i.e., a
fiduciary tax return. It seems to me that the government with respect to the
tax return is doing exactly what it criticizes the taxpayer for doing with
respect to investment advice. And I don’t understand the distinction.
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Souter seemed to take issue with the government’s position that
fiduciary income tax return preparer fees are fully deductible yet
187
Chief
investment advisory fees incurred by a fiduciary are not.
Justice Roberts pointed out the possible effects of this distinction
while discussing how a “customary” or “common” standard would be
applied. He suggested that if the above logic were followed,
investment advisors would simply self-label themselves as “fiduciary
advisors,” which would allow their fees to be fully deductible by the
188
trusts they advise.
Justice Souter highlighted what will likely be the major issue that
the IRS and Treasury must address: how will the regulations define
what is “customary” and what is “common?” If defined narrowly,
fiduciary income tax return preparer fees and fiduciary investment
advisory fees are not customarily or commonly incurred merely
because individuals do not incur “fiduciary” fees and expenses. If
Transcript of Oral Argument at 31–32, Knight, 552 U.S. 181 (No. 06-1286).
187. Id.
188. See id. at 39–40. The following is an excerpt from oral arguments of a
discussion between Chief Justice Roberts and Eric D. Miller, Esq., an assistant to the
Solicitor General, who represented the I.R.S.:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So how does your customary or commonly
incurred test work? Let’s say you have two trusts, one $10 million, the other
[$]10,000. I think an individual with $10 million might well seek investment
advice, but an individual with only [$]10,000 might decide it’s not worth it.
Would you have a different application of the 2 percent rule for those two
trusts?
MR. MILLER: I think if the test is whether— whether the individuals
would have —would commonly ordinarily incur that cost, I think one might
well look at that because the comparison would be individuals with similar
assets, and, as Your Honor knows, there might be a difference depending
on the size.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: How many—how many individuals do you
need? Let’s say it’s $3 million in the trust, and we think maybe 60 percent
of people would hire an investment advisor; 40 percent would think they
can do just as well on their own. Is that customarily incurred by individuals?
MR. MILLER: I think it might well be enough that—for something that
the Service could clarify through—
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Your answer to both questions is “might
well be,” and that’s a fairly vague line when it comes to taxes.
MR. MILLER: The —
JUSTICE SCALIA: And whatever line you—you pick, I guarantee you,
trusts are going to break themselves up into mini-trusts that fall under the
line. I mean people aren’t stupid. (Laughter.)
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Or, even worse, advisors are going to
break themselves up into different advisors. There’s going to be somebody
who says I’m a fiduciary advisor whenever a trustee calls, but, I’m a normal
advisor, when it’s an individual.
See id.
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defined from a broader perspective, income tax return preparer fees
and investment advisory fees are fees commonly incurred by
189
individuals, and are therefore subject to the 2% floor.
It seems as though the IRS and Treasury will be forced to choose
between these two perspectives on what constitutes “common” or
“customary.” And, after completing the above analysis, it seems likely
that the IRS and Treasury will adopt the broad perspective because
the narrow perspective seems to mirror the causation test rejected by
the Court in Knight. If a broad perspective is taken with regard to the
“common or customary” standard, the treatment of fiduciary income
tax preparer fees will have to be changed as a result. Unless the IRS
can articulate how exactly the preparation of a fiduciary income tax
return is sufficiently unique as opposed to fiduciary investment
management fees, the fees associated with preparing a fiduciary
income tax return should be subject to the 2% floor. A major risk of
adopting too broad of an approach to this standard is that it could
completely emasculate the exception Congress enacted, unless
Congress stepped up to remedy the situation by clarifying such a
190
poorly written statute.
In any event, with regard to the bundled fees, the IRS and
Treasury should take into consideration the fact that this fee structure
191
is welcomed by most grantors and beneficiaries alike. Although the
unbundling of a fiduciary’s fee “may be a superficially appropriate
way to encourage similar treatment of similar taxpayers, it would
operate imperfectly in the marketplace of negotiated fee structures . . . and it would represent one more administrative burden in
conflict with Congress’s stated purposes” of section 67 —efficiency
192
and ease of administration.
The IRS and Treasury have yet to release finalized regulations to
this section. Although Notice 2008-32 stated that “final regulations
193
under [Section] 1.67-4 [would] be published without delay” after
the noted comment period, the IRS and Treasury subsequently
released Notice 2008-116, which extended the grace period under the
189. See id. at 31–32.
190. Robert S. Balter & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Knight v. Comr.: The Two Percent
Floor and a Fiduciary’s Investment Advisory Fees, 49 TAX MGM’T MEMO. 155, 171 n.94
(2008) (comparing GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 180 (1909) (“It is not
as speedy or as simple a process to interpret a statute out of existence as to repeal it,
but with time and patient skill, it can often be done.”)).
191. AUCUTT, supra note 133, at 20.
192. Id.
193. Notice 2008-32, 2008-11 I.R.B. 578 at 594.
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previous Notice to include taxable years beginning in 2008. Notice
2008-116 has since been modified and superseded by Notice 2010-32,
which again extended the grace period to taxable years beginning
195
before January 1, 2010.
C. Safe Harbors
In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Knight, many
commentators have suggested that Treasury consider adopting safe
196
harbors from unbundling. One option, for example, is that “the
proposed unbundling obligation should apply only to amounts that
are substantial and significant—and fundamentally that means only to
197
investment advisory fees and security custody fees.” In most cases these
198
are the largest and most significant expenses incurred by fiduciaries.
The use of safe harbors is seen by some as a simplification for tax
199
reporting purposes.
But even if the unbundling requirement is
limited to investment advisory fees and security custody fees, for
example, the fundamental problem of unbundling remains:
“[U]nbundling each telephone call, meeting, letter, note and memo,
not to mention emails, into their respective constituent phrases and
subject matters, and then into each one’s allocable portions of the
costs . . . is not practicable and will be extraordinarily burdensome if
200
not absolutely impossible.”
Others view safe harbors in yet a different light. Some feel that
safe harbors would merely serve as a “complication for fiduciaries,
who—as with many elections under the tax law—would be compelled
by fiduciary duty to calculate the outcome both under the safe harbor
and under a more customized ‘reasonable method’ that might be
201
more favorable to the beneficiaries.”
In addition to being seen as a simplification for tax reporting
purposes, safe harbors may also serve as an alternative to requiring the
Treasury to clearly articulate what constitutes “common” or
“customary,” as set forth in Knight. This alternative, however, is the
source of some suspicion as it is seen “as an unsettling sign that

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Notice 2008-116, 2008-52 I.R.B. 1351 at 1357.
Notice 2010-32, 2010-15 I.R.B. 594 at 594.
Balter & Blattmachr, supra note 190, at 168.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
See AUCUTT, supra note 133, at 23.
Balter & Blattmachr, supra note 190, at 168.
AUCUTT, supra note 133, at 23.
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Treasury and the [IRS] are not open to more bold, comprehensive,
and simplifying exceptions for fiduciaries that would make safe
202
harbors unnecessary . . . .” Regardless of the noted deficiencies, the
adoption of safe harbors is a distinct possibility, as their potential use
was signaled in Notice 2008-32 when it stated that “[t]he final
regulations may contain one or more safe harbors for the allocation
of fees and expenses between those costs that are subject to the 2203
percent floor and those that are not.”
VI. CONCLUSION
The estate planning and wealth management community had
high expectations when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
Knight case. These expectations were rooted in the fact that for more
than twenty years, since the adoption of section 67, trustees were
unsure as to how the 2% floor applied to certain fiduciary fees and
expenses. The Supreme Court took on the case to resolve a longrunning conflict among federal appeals courts. There was hope that
the Supreme Court would settle this conflict and establish a brightline rule by which both the IRS and trustees would be able to
determine with certainty which fiduciary expenses would be fully
deductible and which expenses would be subject to the 2% floor.
The opinion, while logical and well written, did little to clarify the
confusion which surrounds section 67(e). Instead, the Supreme
Court seemed content in setting the boundaries within which the IRS
and Treasury would be allowed to make their own clarification —
specifically, what constitutes “common” or “customarily.” This
clarification, however, has yet to be made. In issuing the final
regulations, the IRS and Treasury should avoid setting forth a rule
that would require a case-by-case analysis of each and every fiduciary
fee or expense. Instead, they should issue a bright-line rule that is
cost-effective and reasonable to administer for both fiduciaries and for
the IRS.
Given the language of section 67(e), establishing this bright-line
rule is easier said than done. Depending on the success that the IRS
and Treasury have with setting forth this rule, the next logical step is
for Congress to address the poorly written statute. This process,
however, may take longer than the two decades it took courts to
address this issue. But until Congress inserts itself into this process,
202.
203.

Id.
Notice 2008-32, 2008-11 I.R.B. 578 at 594.
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trustees will wait patiently in tax law limbo for the finalized
regulations—hoping some reasonable guidance will be provided.
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